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 Introduction
In the second chapter of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason Kant introduces
the ‘table of categories of freedom in regard of the concepts of good and evil’.
is table has baffled many interpreters and has been described as one of the most
obscure parts of Kant’s critical system. Kant does not seem to give any detailed
explanation of what the categories of freedom are supposed to do and how they
are to be derived. Moreover, he does not appeal to or refer to these categories in
the rest of his works despite the fact that the table of the categories of freedom is
supposed to allow us to survey ‘the whole plan of what has to be done, even every
question of practical philosophy that has to be answered, and also the order that
is to be followed.’ (:) It is not even always clear what the individual categories
are since he only describes them by means of incomplete sentences. While leaving
things unexplained in this way he states that he is not going to provide anything
more ‘for the elucidation of the present table, since it is intelligible enough in
itself.’ (:)
In this paper I will provide an account of the different categories, explaining
how they fit together and what role they are supposed to play. I will try to make
the table as intelligible as possible by explaining the categories in terms of well-
known Kantian terminology. is analysis will place particular emphasis on the
structural features that the table of the categories of freedom shares with the table
of judgements and the table of categories laid out by Kant in the Critique of Pure
Reason. e key to an understanding of the categories lies in the realisation that
the categories falling under each heading must form a synthetic unity whereby the
Precursors of the categories of freedom can be found in the form of the categories of morality
and the categories of pure Willkur which Kant mentions in marginalia in his copy of Baumgarten’s
Initia philosophiae practicae primae (cf. R, R and R, all of which were probably
written between  and ). e closest to the categories of freedom that can be found after
the publication of the Critique of Practical Reason are the categories of right and of morality to
which Kant refers at various places in the Vorarbeiten to the Metaphysics of Morals (e.g. :,
: & :), and which are also mentioned in the draft of a letter to Heinrich Jung-Stilling,
written sometime after . March  (cf. : & :).

third one derives from the combination of the other two (cf. B). Moreover,
in the case of the categories of freedom, the first two categories falling under each
heading must be morally undetermined and sensibly conditioned, while the third
category is sensibly unconditioned and is determined only by the moral law (cf.
:).
 e categories of freedom
Table of categories of freedom in regard 
of the concepts of good and evil
1.
Of Quantity
Subjective, according to maxims (volitional opinions of the individual)
Objective, according to principles (precepts)
A priori objective as well as subjective principles of freedom (laws)
2.
Of Quality
Practical rules of commission (praeceptivae)
Practical rules of omission (prohibitivae)
Practical rules of exceptions (exceptivae)
3.
Of Relation
To personality
To the condition of the person
Reciprocally of one person to the condition of another
4.
Modality
The permissible and impermissible
Duty and what is contrary to duty
Perfect and imperfect duty
e title of the table states that it is a table of the categories of freedom in regard
of the concepts of good and evil. In order to understand what this means, we
need to know what categories are in general and what categories of freedom are in
particular. Moreover, we need to find out what it means to qualify them in regard
of the concepts of good and evil.
To begin with, categories are fundamental pure concepts. According to Kant,
all concepts bring different representations under one common representation. He
says that concepts rest on functions. ‘I understand by function the unity of the act
of ordering different representations under a common representation.’ (A/B)
ey are higher-order representations that determine which representations fall
under them. e various representations are synthesised by being combined and
ordered. is synthesis is rule-governed and the concepts provide the rules for
synthesis. us, categories are fundamental concepts that have a function, namely
to unify and order the manifold.

Categories of freedom or categories of practical reason are fundamental prac-
tical concepts that can be used in practical contexts and are concerned with rules
for actions. ey are to be distinguished from the categories of nature which are
fundamental theoretical concepts to be applied in theoretical contexts and which
regard experiences. e former make possible practical rules and therewith actions
by ordering the manifold of desires. e latter are concerned with the synthesis
of the manifold of intuition resulting in experiences. at is, in the case of expe-
rience the material is the manifold of intuition provided by noumenal affection
and it is synthesised to produce experience. In the case of action it is the manifold
of desires deriving from our sensible nature that is synthesised to give us practical
rules upon which we can act.
More precisely, the categories of freedom are pure concepts of practical reason.
Practical reason is concerned with agency resulting from the causality of freedom.
All causation takes place in accordance with rules and causation through freedom
takes place in accordance with practical rules. Actions are rule-governed and these
rules of actions are practical rules or maxims. Practical rules can be considered
as orderings of the manifold of desires (cf. :). at is, they are ways to unify,
subordinate and co-ordinate desires. e manifold of desires is provided by our
sensible side. is manifold is then taken up and synthesised by our practical rea-
son, resulting in practical rules. is ordering and synthesising of the manifold
takes place via rules. ese rules of synthesis are the categories of freedom. e
categories are needed to give a complete characterisation or specification of a prac-
tical rule since they concern the different fundamental features of practical rules,
namely their quantity, quality, relation and modality. A practical rule must be
determined with respect to each of these headings in the table of categories.
Accordingly, the table of the categories of freedom is the table of the pure and
fundamental practical concepts that are concerned with the use of freedom, i.e.
with practical rules or maxims of actions. Freedom is a kind of causality that is
based on rules and which leads to actions. ese actions and the practical rules
on which they are based can be considered from two points of view. On the
one hand, one can give a causal descriptive account of them which covers their
phenomenal characteristics. is description and explanation proceeds by appeal-
ing to the causal laws that connect phenomena. On the other hand, actions can
be subjected to moral evaluation when they are considered as the products of an
agent’s freedom (spontaneity). is latter assessment is performed in terms of the
concepts of good and evil. It is from this viewpoint that the practical rules under-
lying the causality of freedom are considered.
A table of categories systematically represents and orders all the categories ap-
Practical rules have to be understood in a broad sense as first-personal rules in general and are
not to be solely identified with the specific rules deriving from pragmatic imperatives (cf. Beck:
, p. ).

plicable to a particular domain. Tables of categories possess a distinctive structure
insofar as they consist of four headings, with three categories falling under each.
According to Kant, we have this structure because the a priori division of a process
of synthesis is tetrachotomous while that of a synthetic concept is trichotomous
(cf. R). e headings correspond to sub-functions of the process of synthe-
sis of the manifold. e categories represent ways in which the manifold can be
synthesised, whereby each heading represents one feature with respect to which
synthesis can take place. at is, the synthesis corresponding to each feature can
be understood as a sub-function and is represented by a heading in the table of
categories. e sub-functions are related in such a way that we have a progression,
whereby each sub-function presupposes the previous ones, starting with quantity,
which is the most basic one, followed by quality, relation and modality.
We can divide the categories falling under the titles into two classes, namely
the mathematical categories and the dynamical categories (cf. B). e former
are the categories of quantity and quality and are concerned with the practical
rule or experience considered in itself independently of any relation in which it
stands. e latter are the categories of relation and modality and they focus on
the connections to other objects, practical rules or experiences.
e categories falling under each title form a three-fold synthetic unity, whereby
the first two produce the third when jointly combined, without the third category
having a derivative status since it is based on a distinct function of synthesis. ‘[T]he
third category always arises from the combination of the second with the first in
its class.’ (B, also cf. letter to J. Schultz //, :-) ese three
categories constitute an exhaustive account of the fundamental principles of syn-
thesis falling within each sub-function. ere are precisely three of them because
a synthetic unity requires ‘) a condition, ) a conditioned, ) the concept which
arises out of the combination of the conditioned with its condition.’ (:) Any
interpretation of the categories of freedom must respect this feature by giving an
account of the categories that allows for the third category to result from the com-
bination of the first and second category in a non-derivative way.
A peculiar feature of the table of the categories of freedom is that ‘these cate-
gories concern only practical reason in general and so proceed in their order from
those which are morally still undetermined and sensibly conditioned to those
which, being sensibly unconditioned, are determined only by the moral law.’
(:) ough the categories are concerned with practical rules and dispositions
of the will, they also apply to non-moral actions since those actions also result
from maxims. While maxims are not the objects of those actions, it nonethe-
less follows that these actions can be categorised by the categories as they contain
maxims which are determined by the categories. is ascendence from morally
undetermined to morally conditioned categories is one of the structural features
that the table of the categories of freedom possesses and hence constitutes a nec-
essary condition for any interpretation of the categories of freedom.

Sensibly conditioned features of practical rules are features that obtain in virtue
of some sensible condition. If a practical rule is determined with respect to a sen-
sibly conditioned category, then this rule possesses the feature corresponding to
that category in virtue of some sensible condition. For example, rules of com-
mission are sensibly conditioned since if a rule tells me to do x, then it does so
in virtue of a sensible condition, namely the condition that I desire x. Similarly,
subjective maxims are sensibly conditioned since if a rule holds for me, then it
does so in virtue of a sensible condition, namely that it is based on an inclination
that I have. Again, permissible and impermissible rules are dependent on sensible
conditions, since if a rule necessitates problematically, then it does so in virtue of
a sensible condition, namely that it leads to the satisfaction of a possible end.
Features that are determined by the moral law, on the contrary, are features
that a practical rule possesses in virtue of the moral law. For instance, laws hold
for everyone because of the universality of the moral law. Moral practical rules
are rules of exception due to the overridingness of morality which requires us to
make an exception if categorical and hypothetical imperatives clash. Similarly,
moral practical rules are reciprocally implementable due to the universalisability
of moral maxims that is required by the moral law. Finally, perfect and imperfect
duties necessitate apodictically as a result of the categoricity of the moral law.
us, any interpretation or reconstruction must meet the following two gen-
eral criteria, namely it must give an account of the categories such that (i) the
third category under each heading can be derived from the combination of the
previous two, and (ii) the first two categories must be sensibly conditioned and
morally undetermined, while the third one is sensibly unconditioned and morally
determined. In addition, there are further criteria that apply to particular head-
ings which can be identified by examining the tables of categories in the Critique
of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena (cf. sections . & . below).
. : and :
Kant’s claim at : has been understood as indicating a progression from sensibly
conditioned to morally determined categories within each heading of the table of
categories. An alternative interpretation of : is that the progression takes place
not within each heading, but is rather a progression amongst the headings. at
is, some have argued that the categories falling under headings one, two and three
are sensibly conditioned and morally undetermined and that only the categories
of modality are morally determined. is seems to be supported by what Kant
All the examples of sensibly conditioned features and morally determined features will be
explained in detail later on when the individual categories are examined.
For ease of reference, I will refer to this interpretation as the ‘proposed interpretation’ and to
the other interpretation as the ‘alternative interpretation’.
is reading is accepted by, among others, Bobzien and C. G. Schutz (cf. Bobzien: , pp.
- and section . below).

says at :, namely that ‘in this table freedom is regarded as a kind of causality ...
with regard to the actions possible through it as appearances in the sensible world,
and that consequently it is referred to the categories of their natural possibility ...
until the categories of modality introduce, but only problematically, the transition
from practical principles in general to those of morality, which can only afterwards
be presented dogmatically through the moral law.’
Generally, commentators reject the alternative interpretation because already
the third category under the first heading seems to be morally determined. is
category is that of a priori objective as well as subjective principles of freedom
(laws), which clearly seems to be a morally determined category, thereby under-
mining the alternative interpretation. Attempts have been made to explain away
this feature, but it will be shown in section . that these attempts fail.
Moreover, there are a number of other reasons why the alternative interpreta-
tion should not be accepted. One such reason is that there must be a qualitative
difference between the first two categories and the third category falling under
each heading. e three categories form a synthetic unity whereby the third is de-
rived from the combination of the first two in such a way that it does not become
a derivative category. e third category must still be fundamental and this is
achieved by means of a qualitative difference that distinguishes it from the others.
e best candidate for this qualitative difference in the case of the categories of
freedom is that the first two are non-moral, while the third is moral.
In addition, the alternative interpretation would commit us to an interpre-
tation of the categories of modality that cannot satisfy the first interpretative cri-
terion and that conflicts with what Kant says in the Preface (cf. section . below).
While the alternative interpretation already stumbles when it comes to the
first heading, the interpretation that is defended in this paper is not without its
problems. It is usually seen to be unsuccessful due to the failure to give moral
interpretations of the third categories under the headings of quality and relation.
is situation will be remedied in sections . and . below, where it will be
shown that the third categories of these two headings qualify as good candidates
for being morally determined, while the first and second categories are always
sensibly conditioned.
A further objection to the proposed interpretation is that it clashes with :.
ere Kant says that the categories of modality introduce the transition from prac-
tical principles in general to practical principles of morality. According to the
proposed interpretation this means that practical principles that are synthesised
in accordance with categories one and two of modality are practical principles in
general, while those synthesised in accordance with the third category are practical
It is also noteworthy that Kant attributes a special significance to the third categories of nature
since they play a crucial role in making possible the unity of experience.
As a result of this situation some have argued that : does not commit us to any general
criterion that is supposed to apply to all headings (cf. Graband: , p.  footnote ).

principles of morality. Bobzien objects to this reading, noting that Kant claims
that the categories of modality introduce the transition, rather than claiming that
the transition is introduced in the categories of modality (cf. Bobzien: , p.
). However, since we do not have practical principles that are not determined
with respect to modality, it follows that the only way that the categories of modal-
ity can introduce the transition is insofar as that transition takes place within these
categories.
Finally, we can reconcile the claims made at : and : by noting that
there is a shift from talking about morally determined categories in the former
passage to practical principles of morality in the latter passage. While the third
categories are determined by the moral law, we require the categories of modality
in order to get practical principles. In particular, we require the third category of
modality in order to get practical principles of morality. A morally determined
category does not as yet give us a practical principle. A practical principle is one
that is determined with respect to each of the headings of the table. A practical
principle of morality is one that is determined with respect to each of the morally
determined categories.
e third categories regard different aspects of moral principles and these as-
pects are determined by the moral law. is makes sense in that a moral principle
must be determined with respect to each of the headings. e third categories of
all headings are only involved in moral principles and specify the distinctive char-
acteristics that moral principles possess, namely that they are characterised by (i)
universality, (ii) overridingness, (iii) universalisability, and (iv) categoricity. ese
characteristics are determined by the moral law. None of these features is possessed
by non-moral principles, and no moral principles lack any of these features.
If only the categories of modality should be morally determined, as suggested
by the alternative interpretation, then this would imply that the quantity, quality
and relation of moral principles would be sensibly conditioned. is, however,
cannot be the case since moral principles are sensibly unconditioned. Two op-
tions present themselves. Either, one accepts the proposed interpretation of :,
which would imply that a moral principle is one that involves only the third cate-
gories of each heading. Or, one accepts Benton’s claim that all categories, with the
exception of the category of perfect duty and imperfect duty, are neither purely
moral nor merely prudential. e latter option, however, does not fit with :,
as Benton himself notes (cf. Benton: , p. ). Moreover, as was mentioned
above, it is not only the case that all moral principles possess those features char-
acterised by the third categories, but also that all non-moral principles lack those
features. Accordingly, we can conclude that the third categories really are sensibly
unconditioned and determined by the moral law, as suggested by the proposed
interpretation.
Moreover, both the notion of ‘transition’ (Ubergang) and of ‘introducing’ (einleiten) seem to
have connotations of referring to gradual processes.

. Speculative intermezzo: e dogmatic presentation of the prac-
tical principles of morality
At : Kant says that ‘the categories of modality introduce, but only problem-
atically, the transition from practical principles in general to those of morality,
which can only afterwards be presented dogmatically through the moral law.’ is
passage should be understood as making a reference to the fact of reason (cf. Beck:
, p. ). More precisely, the fact of reason turns problematic moral prin-
ciples into claims following analytically from the moral law that can be presented
dogmatically. Morality consists of claims which are analytically entailed by the
moral law. e moral law is the supreme principle of morality from which all of
morality follows analytically. It is a synthetic principle that requires grounding.
is grounding is provided in the Deduction in section III of the Groundwork
and in the form of the fact of reason. Once the foundations have been secured
by the Critique of Practical Reason we are entitled to use the dogmatic method to
present the, initially problematic, claims of morality that follow analytically from
the moral law.
e dogmatic presentation of the practical principles of morality through the
moral law thus consists in using the dogmatic method for the presentation of these
practical principles on the basis of the a priori principle embodied in themoral law.
e moral law is the principle or formula by which one can dogmatically arrive
at the individual token moral principles. In this way morality is turned into a
science and the table of categories constitutes the plan of this science (cf. : and
R). is requires the fact of reason, since in order to use the dogmatic method
without falling into dogmatism (cf. Bxxxv) the foundation must first be secured.
As Kant says in the Critique of Judgement ‘[i]n order to utilise it dogmatically ...,
we would have to be assured of the objective reality of this concept beforehand.’
(:)
Kant combines the two ideas of dogmatic method and practical grounding in
his notion of a practico-dogmaticmethod, which is distinguished from a theoretico-
dogmatic method. is notion becomes particularly prominent in his  Preiss-
chrift uber die Vortschritte der Metaphysik. ere he says that ‘Freedom, from which
we have to begin, since we only cognise the laws of this supersensible entity, under
the name of moral laws, a priori, therewith dogmatically, but only in a practical
respect, according to which the final end is alone possible.’ (:) at is, we
know the laws of freedom, i.e. the moral laws, a priori and therewith dogmati-
cally, but only from a practical point of view. e principles of morality can be
presented in a dogmatic manner once the fact of reason is given. e dogmatic
employment requires that the objective reality of the concept in question be se-
cured. If this foundation is provided by appealing to practical considerations, as
Cf. Metaphysics of Morals: ‘A division according to an a priori principle (in contrast to one
that is empirical) can now be called dogmatic.’ (:)

is done in the case of the fact of reason, then the method is practico-dogmatic.
us, when Kant says at : that the categories of modality problematically
introduce a transition to practical principles of morality which can afterwards be
presented dogmatically, he means that the third category of modality is a prob-
lematic concept. is is because it presupposes transcendental freedom which is
a problematic concept (cf. A/B) from a theoretical point of view. is is
because we cannot theoretically cognise the objective reality of that concept. at
is, the third category presupposes a problematic notion of freedom. It thereby
ensures that the practical principles of morality, which relate to the third cate-
gory of modality, are problematic principles until they receive grounding. Hav-
ing received grounding, they can then be presented dogmatically. We can only
ground the objective reality of freedom and of morality in practical considera-
tions, more precisely in the fact of reason. Accordingly, we can only proceed
practico-dogmatically, not theoretico-dogmatically.
 e individual categories
. Quantity
Quantity is concerned with the extension or domain of the practical rule. It de-
termines the domain of applicability – for whom this rule holds. ere are:
. subjective rules or maxims that hold for the agent
. objective rules or precepts that hold for everyone with the same
inclinations
. laws that hold for everyone unconditionally and absolutely
is interpretation is supported by what Kant says at :, namely that one knows
from the heading of quantity ‘where one has to set out from in practical consider-
ations: from the maxims that each bases on his inclination, the precepts that hold
for a species of rational beings insofar as they agree in certain inclinations, and
finally the law that holds for all regardless of their inclinations’. Moreover, it also
accords well with his distinction of different principles in x of the first chapter of
the Analytic. ere he says that ‘[p]ractical principles are propositions that contain
a general determination of the will, that has several practical rules under it. ey
are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is regarded by the subject as hold-
ing only for his will; but they are objective, or practical laws, when the condition
is cognized as objective, that is, as holding for the will of every rational being.’
(:) is distinction between maxims and laws must simply be supplemented
by precepts in order to arrive at the categories of quantity. Precepts are objective
practical rules that are conditional on the presence of shared inclinations.
C (): Subjective rules hold for one person, namely the subject. Ob-
jective rules hold for a plurality of people, namely those that agree in certain incli-
nations. When we combine subjective and objective rules, we get laws which hold

objectively for every subject. ey are objective rules that do not depend on the
contingencies of the subjects. ey hold for the totality of all rational beings, and,
according to Kant, ‘allness (totality) is nothing other than plurality considered as
unity.’ (B)
C (): Subjective and objective rules only hold conditionally since
they are based on inclinations, whereas morality binds unconditionally. Accord-
ingly, the first two categories are sensibly conditioned since they depend on the
inclinations of the agents, whereas laws are sensibly unconditioned since they do
not depend on inclinations but hold unconditionally.
As mentioned earlier, it is the third category of quantity that has been consid-
ered as one of the main obstacles for the alternative interpretation of : which
states that only categories of modality are moral categories. In response to this
problem, both Benton and Bobzien have attempted to give a non-moral interpre-
tation of the category of laws. ‘A law is always both universal and necessary, so
that by putting the moral law under the heading of quantity Kant has abstracted
from the law’s necessity and treated it only according to its universality.’ (Benton:
, p. ) Similarly, Bobzien argues that the third category only coincides
extensionally with moral laws (cf. Bobzien: , p. ).
It is indeed correct that the third category of quantity coincides with laws
only as regards their extension, namely their universality. is, however, does not
prevent this category from being sensibly unconditioned and determined by the
moral law. Moral principles must hold for everyone and possess unconditioned
universality. It is the moral law that determines this characteristic of moral princi-
ples. at is, a moral principle, like every other practical rule, must have a domain
and this domain is characterised by the categories of quantity. Now, the moral
law determines that moral principles must hold for everyone and accordingly that
moral principles are ‘a priori objective as well as subjective principles of freedom’.
From this it follows that the third category of quantity is determined by the moral
law, as is to be expected given the proposed interpretation of what Kant says at
:.
. Quality
Quality determines what the rule says – it is required for making a command in
the same way that quality is required in judgements for making a claim. It does
not specify the nature of the action but determines whether a particular action is
to be performed or omitted or whether an exception is to be made. ere are:
. rules that tell us to do x
. rules that tell us to not do x
. rules that tell us to do x even though there is a rule to not do x, or
not to do x even though there is a rule to do x

C (): Exceptions clearly result from the combination of commis-
sions and omissions, since they tell us to commit something even though there is
a rule to omit it or to omit something even though there is a rule to commit it.
C (): Practical rules of commission and omission are sensibly con-
ditioned. e former depend on the faculty of desire, telling us to seek out that
which is agreeable and promotes our well-being. e latter depend on the faculty
of aversion and command us to avoid what is disagreeable and leads to ill-being.
Good and evil, on the contrary, pertain to practical rules of exceptions. ese
are moral rules that are sensibly unconditioned. Only moral rules can be rules of
exceptions since only the moral law can override other rules. Nothing but a cate-
gorical imperative can dismiss hypothetical imperatives. It is only when moral and
inclination-based rules conflict that we have a real exception. Morality overrides
the claims of inclination and hypothetical imperatives lose their normative force
in these particular instances and an exception is to be made (cf. :). In other
cases, when different hypothetical imperatives clash, then all there is is a change of
ends which results in a new rule being based on the new end. Properly speaking,
in this case it is not rules that override each other but ends. at is, there are no
sensibly conditioned rules of exceptions. No such exceptions exist because sensi-
bly conditioned rules all have the same status and there is no normative difference
between them that could let one rule trump another in such a way as to produce
an exception.
It should be noted that there is an important distinction between there being
exceptions to a rule and there being a practical rule of exception. While there are
empirical exceptions to non-moral rules, these exceptions do not amount to prac-
tical rules of exceptions but simply constitute circumstances in which the precepts
do not apply. Precepts have conditions built into them and we should not follow
the precepts when these conditions are not met, but that does not mean that there
is a practical rule of exception.
In order to have practical rules of exceptions that can override other rules, we
need rules with different statuses, rules of a different nature. Different hypothet-
ical imperatives have the same normative standing. e categorical imperative is
the only thing that can trump them and thereby make possible exceptions to the
practical rules embodied by hypothetical imperatives. e categorical imperative
itself is a supreme normative principle that cannot be trumped and hence the only
practical rules of exceptions that exist are those that tell us to follow morality at
the expense of hypothetical imperatives.
It is not only the case that all rules of exceptions are moral rules, but that there
are no moral rules of commission and no moral rules of omission. In other words,
all moral rules are rules of exceptions. is is because the categorical imperative
is a procedure for testing maxims or rules which involves rejecting those that do
not possess the right form. A rule is proposed by inclination and assessed for
universalisability. Non-universalisable rules are then rejected, which means that

the moral law requires us to make exceptions to such rules.
What look like moral commissions and omissions, such as the injunction not
to lie, are in fact abbreviations of practical rules of exceptions. For example, the
imperative not to lie amounts to the practical rule of exception that says that one
should not lie even though there is a hypothetical imperative telling one to lie if
it is in one’s interest. at is, a hypothetical imperative suggests a rule, namely a
rule to do x or a rule to not do x. is rule is then either accepted as permissi-
ble or rejected as impermissible. In the latter case we arrive at a practical rule of
exception that is determined by the moral law. Such a rule tells us to do x even
though the hypothetical imperative told us to not do x, or it tells us to do x even
though the hypothetical imperative told us to do x. Since this is the only way
in which the moral law determines concrete practical rules, namely by rejecting
hypothetical imperatives that are proposed by inclination, it follows that moral
practical rules are always rules of exceptions. Accordingly, we can see that it is
the category of practical rules of exceptions that characterises the overridingness
of moral principles and that, pace Beck, Benton et al., criterion (ii) does apply to
the categories of quality (cf. Beck: , p.  and Benton: , p. ).
us, there are general rules corresponding to hypothetical imperatives, but
these rules are subordinated to morality. We thereby get practical rules of excep-
tions that tell us to do what is necessary to achieve one’s ends unless they conflict
with what is morally commanded. In cases of conflict we should make an excep-
tion to the general rule and instead follow the commands of morality.
Exceptions can come in two types, namely as exceptions to commissions and
as exceptions to omissions. ese two types correspond to negative and positive
duties. In case that an exception is made to a rule of commission, we end up with
a negative duty. e commission is ruled out as being impermissible, resulting in
a negative duty not to act on certain hypothetical imperatives that are proposed by
inclination. An exception to a rule of omission gives us a positive duty that tells
us that a general rule not to do a particular kind of action is non-universalisable
and that we thus have a positive duty to commit that kind of action.
From the categories of quality we can derive the priority of negative duties.
is is because of the priority of exceptions to commissions. e first category is
always the most basic in any synthetic division – it is the condition whereas the
second one is the conditioned. us, since exceptions to commissions constitute
negative duties, whereas exceptions to omissions constitute positive duties, and
since the former type of exception is prior to the latter type, it follows that negative
duties are prior to positive duties.
. Relation
e categories of relation are dynamical categories. ey are concerned with the
relations in which practical rules stand. Pace Beck we should note that they are

not concerned with the moral evaluation of rules (Beck: , p. ) – only
the categories of modality concern moral assessment and the prescriptive force of
rules. e categories of relation are still concerned with the specification of the
rules, with determining their content (cf. A/B). It is simply the case that one
is no longer concerned with the intrinsic, but the relational features of the rules.
Once again we can closely model the categories of freedom on the categories of
nature by considering agents rather than substances and by focusing on practical
rules rather than accidents per se. e categories concern:
. practical rules as inhering in a subject and resulting from the free-
dom of that subject
. practical rules that have effects on persons
. practical rules that imply a reciprocal relation between agent and
patient
ere are a number of structural features that are peculiar to the categories of
relation. One such feature is that the first two categories of relation are always,
broadly speaking, sub-ordination relations, whereas the third category is a co-
ordination relation. is results from the fact that the first two categories are
concerned with what Kant calls ‘heteronomic’ relations, while the third category
regards ‘homonomic’ relations (cf. R, :). A relation is heteronomic
if the relata are of different kinds, which implies that a relatum of one kind is
sub-ordinated to another relatum of a different kind. e relation involved in the
third category, on the contrary, is homonomic insofar as the relata are of the same
kind, which implies that they are related by a co-ordination relation.
is condition is clearly met by the table of judgements. In categorical judge-
ments there is a division between two concepts, whereby one is treated as the
subject and the other as the predicate such that the predicate is sub-ordinated to
the subject. In hypothetical judgements two judgements are sub-ordinated to each
other in such a way that one becomes the condition of the other. In disjunctive
judgements there is no asymmetrical relation between the different constitutive
judgements; rather the different judgements are co-ordinated. e proposed inter-
pretation satisfies this condition insofar as the inherence and dependence relations
featuring in categories one and two are sub-ordination relations. Reciprocity, on
the contrary, whether at the theoretical or practical level, is a kind of co-ordination,
rather than sub-ordination (cf. B).
Another structural feature is that the first category must be the basis of the
others. Kant says in the Prolegomena that ‘as in logic categorical judgements are
the basis of all others, so the category of substance is the basis of all concepts of
actual things.’ (: footnote) Accordingly, the category ‘to personality’ must
be included in and form the basis of the other two categories. In the case of the
categories of nature we have substances interacting in a co-ordinated and recip-
rocal manner giving us the third category, while the accidents of one substance
are affecting those of another in the second category. is can be transposed to

the practical case by considering the substances as agents acting towards others,
whether reciprocally or not.
A third structural feature is that the categories of relation must have corre-
lates. All dynamical categories connect different things, whereby in the case of the
categories of relation the different relata are correlates of each other (cf. B).
Subsistence and inherence are correlates, as well as cause and effect. In the case
of the first two categories of freedom Kant only tells us one of the relata, without
giving us the correlate that is supposed to be connected to it. Only reciprocity
is a category of freedom for which the correlate is explicitly given. Practical rules
seem to be adequate candidates for being the correlates of the first two categories.
In the first case, they amount to accidents that stand in inherence relations, while
in the latter case they count as the grounds of empirical effects.
We can thus specify the relational features of a practical rule in terms of (i)
the subject in which it inheres, (ii) the effects it has on the condition of a per-
son, and (iii) the effects it has on the conditions of different people if reciprocally
implemented.
C (): e third category is concerned with a reciprocal relation be-
tween agent and patient. is can be understood as the synthesis of the first two
categories. e second category is that of an agent-patient structure, whereby the
agent is specified by the first category. Now, the third category can be gained in-
sofar as both agent and patient are considered as being classified by the first two
categories at the same time. Reciprocity occurs where the patient of category two
is himself an agent according to category one and vice versa.
C (): e first two categories must be sensibly conditioned. is
seems problematic when considering the first category, given that Kant identifies
personality at : as being essentially tied up with freedom and independence of
determination (cf. Bobzien: , p. ). However, while the notion of per-
sonality itself is non-sensible, the category ‘to personality’ is sensibly conditioned
insofar as that which inheres in personality, i.e. its accident, is sensibly condi-
tioned since it is an ordering of desires. at is, that which is related to personality
is sensibly conditioned implying that the first category is sensibly conditioned.
We are not concerned with personality per se, but with a relational category con-
necting practical rules to personality. While personality is sensibly unconditioned,
this does not apply to the practical rules, thereby ensuring that the overall status
of this relational category is that of a sensibly conditioned category.
ere is a further consideration to which we can appeal in order to reduce
the moral character of the notion of ‘personality’, thereby making it more plausi-
ble that this category is sensibly conditioned and morally undetermined. We can
parallel Kant’s move in theCritique of Pure Reason by interpreting the practical cat-
egory ‘to personality’ as referring to phenomenal personality in the same way that
Kant allows the theoretical category ‘substantia et accidens’ to refer to phenomenal

substance (substantia phaenomena).
We can see that the second category is sensibly conditioned insofar as it con-
cerns the material effects on the state or condition of persons. Practical rules are
classified in terms of the effects they have or are intended to have on persons. is
interpretation may appear to cause problems for showing that the category of reci-
procity is sensibly unconditioned insofar as this category focuses on the conditions
of persons in the same way as the second category does. However, we can see that
the third category is sensibly unconditioned because it involves abstracting from
the material effects and only assesses the formal question as to whether or not the
practical rule or maxim is reciprocally implementable. is category concerns the
universalisability of moral practical rules that is embodied by the procedure for
testing maxims that the categorical imperative prescribes.
More precisely, the third category is morally determined insofar as practical
rules that are synthesised according to the relation of reciprocity are rules that
bring about, if consistently implemented, the kingdom of ends. e kingdom
of ends is equivalent to the notion of a moral world which Kant discusses in the
Critique of Pure Reason. A moral world is a thoroughgoing systematic unity ac-
cording to moral laws (cf. A/B). is understanding of the moral world
clearly brings out the relation to the moral category of reciprocity. is is because
a world or a community is a whole, a systematic unity that arises out of the re-
ciprocal interactions amongst individuals (cf. R & :). e category
of reciprocity is essentially connected to the notion of universalisability and the
co-ordination of different agents insofar as the practical rule must be amenable to
symmetrical implementation. In the theoretical sphere, Kant talks of the result of
reciprocity being some form of causal ‘community’ (cf. R & R). In the
practical realm this then amounts to a moral community. us, the category of
reciprocity is determined by the moral law and characterises the universalisability
of moral principles. Once again we can see that, pace Beck, Benton et al., criterion
(ii) does apply to the categories of relation (cf. Beck: , p.  and Benton:
, p. ).
. Modality
Modality concerns the relation between the rule in question and other rules. Like
the dynamical categories of relation it is concerned with the relational features of
practical rules. However, unlike in the case of the categories of relation, we are
here not concerned with broadly speaking metaphysical relations, but rather with
logical relations. As a result, modality does not add anything to the rule itself, but
puts it into a network, assessing its interrelations, in particular its compatibility
Kant himself does not use this notion of phenomenal personality. However, it should be
noted that ‘personality’ does not always have moral connotations for him since he frequently uses
the notion of transcendental or psychological personality (e.g. :) and in one place even refers
to ‘empirical personality’ (:).

with other rules. It is concerned with how the rule is to be asserted or assessed –
as Kant says with respect to the table of judgement, modality ‘concerns only the
value of the copula.’ (A/B) ere are practical rules that necessitate:
. problematically (possible – impossible)
. assertorically (actual – non-actual)
. apodictically (necessary – contingent)
In a footnote in the Preface Kant provides some explanation of the categories of
modality. ‘us, in the table of categories of practical reason under the heading
Modality, the permitted and the forbidden (the practically objectively possible and
impossible), have almost the same sense in the common use of language as the
immediately following category, duty and contrary to duty; here, however, the first
mean that which harmonizes or conflicts with a merely possible practical precept
..., the second, that which stands in such a relation to a law actually present in
reason as such. ... We have here to do only with the distinction of imperatives
under problematic, assertoric, and apodictic determining grounds.’ (: footnote)
is clearly supports the suggested understanding in terms of possible, actual and
necessary practical rules and their opposites, namely impossible, non-actual and
contingent rules. is interpretation closely follows the categories of modality in
the Critique of Pure Reason and gives us the different kinds of imperatives, namely
hypothetical imperatives which are either problematic or assertoric and categorical
imperatives which are apodictic.
A controversial implication of this interpretation is that we have to understand
Pflicht and Pflichtwidrig in non-moral terms in this context. According to Beck
it is a ‘fatal objection’ (Beck: , p. ) to this view that it implies this non-
moral understanding of ‘duty’. However, we canmake sense of this notion of ‘duty’
since pragmatic imperatives are normative without being moral. Since we are
bound by assertoric hypothetical imperatives it would seem to follow that they do
qualify as duties in a loose sense. If we do indeed desire the end, then we ought to
take the means necessary for the achievement of this end (unless the hypothetical
imperative is overridden by a categorical imperative), where this ‘ought’ has to be
understood as a non-moral ought.
Mellin accepts a similar interpretation, arguing that the second category of modality should
be understood as involving assertoric imperatives and, accordingly, a broader understanding of
‘duty’ that is not specifically moral (cf. Mellin: , p. ). Benton also argues for a non-moral
interpretation of the second category though he claims that all categories, except that of perfect
and imperfect duty, are neither purely moral nor merely prudential (cf. Benton: , pp.  &
).
Paton also appears to make room for a broad notion of ‘duty’ or ‘obligation’ since he states
that all three kinds of imperative involve a kind of obligation – ‘corresponding to the three kinds
of good action there will be three kinds of action in some sense obligatory’. (Paton: , p. )
is view can also be found in Kant’s claim that ‘[a]ll imperatives are expressed by an ought and
indicate by this the relation of an objective law of reason to a will that by its subjective constitution
is not necessarily determined by it (a necessitation).’ (:)

In general, all these practical rules involve some kind of normativity. ey
all necessitate the will. ey are rules of practical necessitation (necessitatio prac-
tica), as opposed to pathological necessitation. ey determine the will, whether
problematically, assertorically or apodictically. All such practical necessitation is
expressed by imperatives. It is not based on stimulus, but involves necessitation
that is objective even though in the case of the first two imperatives it is non-moral
practical necessitation (cf. :-).
Kant provides a clear distinction between problematical, assertorical and apo-
dictical rules in theMetaphysics Lectures (Politz, :), by assessing the practical
necessitation that each of them involves. ere he distinguishes them as follows:
) Necessitatio problematica, where the understanding cognises the
necessity of the use of the means under the condition of the given
end, e.g. in geometry.
) Necessitatio pragmatica, where the understanding cognises the ne-
cessity of the use of the means with respect to the universal end of
every thinking being.
) Necessitatio moralis. is is the necessity of the use of power of
free choice, not as means to an end, but rather because it is in itself
necessary.
Schutz criticises Kant’s claim in the Preface: ‘at in the Preface to the Critique
of Pure Practical Reason what is permissible for an orator qua tali etc. is provided
as an example of permitted actions appears to me to be a metabasis eis allo genos,
namely into the rules of skill, which you yourself have so astutely distinguished
from the commands of morality.’ (letter by C. G. Schutz //, :-
) He then proposes his own revision of the categories of modality whereby
all three of them are moral categories. It seems that Schutz is right in criticising
the position whereby the first category is non-moral and the second and third are
moral categories. Either, one should provide an interpretation whereby all modal
categories are morally determined, in which case one should then accept the alter-
native interpretation of passages : and : that was rejected above. Or, one
should have the first two sensibly conditioned and only the third one determined
by the moral law. e second interpretation has the problem of committing us to
a non-moral reading of ‘duty’. However, it is strongly supported by the footnote
in the Preface – there Kant is particularly clear that the first and second categories
Kant gives the geometry example both in the footnote in the Preface and at :.
e universal end of every thinking being is, of course, self-love or happiness. As Kant says,
there is ‘one end that can be presupposed as actual in the case of all rational beings ... and that
purpose is happiness.’ (:)
‘Da in der Vorrede zur Critik der reinen praktischen Vernunft zu den erlaubten Handlungen
als ein Beyspiel angefuhrt wird, was einem Redner qua tali erlaubt sey etc. scheint mir eine metaba-
sis eis allo genos zu seyn, nemlich in die Regeln der Geschicklichkeit, die Sie selbst so scharfsinnig
von den Geboten der Sittlichkeit unterschieden haben.’

of modality are not to be understood in a moral sense which is strong evidence for
rejecting the former alternative.
e correlates into which each category is divided are exact opposites of each
other. In the Metaphysics Lectures (Vigilantius) Kant says that ‘the categories of
relation and modality carry with them sheer correlates, which are placed next to
one another such that when one is posited, the other is posited. ... Just as little
are reality and negation compatible next to each other, just as the modalities are
cancelled by each other in their correlates.’ (:) Some commentators have
thought that this cannot straightforwardly be applied to the categories of freedom.
For example, Mellin notes ‘It is noteworthy here that imperfect duty is not prop-
erly that which conflicts with a law that necessarily resides in reason (as it is the
case with the other categories, namely the permissible and impermissible, duty
and contrary to duty), which would be that which is contrary to a perfect duty.’
(Mellin: , p. )
However, we can see that perfect duty and imperfect duty are correlates that
constitute an exhaustive division once we understand that necessary and contin-
gent duties exhaust the sphere of apodictic rules. As Bobzien notes ‘e respec-
tive negative correlative concept could have been formed according to the principle
[Prinzip] of making an exhaustive binary division within the domain identified by
the relevant principle [Grundsatz].’ (Bobzien: , p.  also cf. Graband:
, p. )e same happens within the theoretical sphere, where the categories
of necessity and contingency are opposites since they characterise what is existent
and since everything that exists either exists necessarily or it exists contingently.
Categorical rules can be characterised as imposing necessary or contingent require-
ments. We are bound categorically by both perfect and imperfect duties, though
the former bind us categorically to fulfil a necessary requirement, while the latter
bind us categorically to fulfil a contingent requirement. A perfect duty is some-
thing where it is not possible to not do it, while an imperfect duty is something
where it is possible to not do it. As Kant states: ‘Necessary is that of which the
opposite is impossible; ... contingent is that of which the opposite is possible.’
(:)
e same applies for the other categories. at is, duty and contrary to duty
do not exhaust the set of all rules or actions, i.e. it is not the case that every ac-
tion is either classified as duty or contrary to duty. Rather, the categories of duty
‘Es ist hier merkwurdig, dass die unvollkommene Pflicht eigentlich nicht das ist, was einem
in der Vernunft nothwendig liegenden Gesetz widerstreitet, (wie es bei den andern Kategorien,
dem Erlaubten und Unerlaubten, der Pflicht und dem Pflichtwidrigen der Fall ist), welches das
Pflichtwidrige einer vollkommenen Pflicht seyn wurde.’
It is clear that for Kant necessary duties are to be equated with perfect duties and that contin-
gent duties are equivalent to imperfect duties (cf. :-).
‘Der jeweilige negative Korrelatbegriff kann nach dem Prinzip gebildet worden sein, innerhalb
des je durch den entsprechenden Grundsatz aufgespannten Bereichs eine vollstandige Zweiteilung
zu erhalten.’

and contrary to duty exhaust the set of all actions that are pragmatically necessary.
e division is not between what is pragmatically necessary and what is not prag-
matically necessary, but rather constitutes a division within what is pragmatically
necessary, distinguishing what is positively pragmatically necessary from what is
negatively pragmatically necessary. e former is required and harmonises with
the actual end while the latter is negatively required since it conflicts with this end.
C (): Beck thinks that the first structural criterion cannot be ful-
filled. ‘Whereas, before, the third category has been an almost Hegelian synthesis
of the first two, the third category here arises from a logical division of the second.
Of anything that is actual, we can say that it is either necessarily or contingently
actual. Of an actual duty, Kant says – by a very tenuous analogy – that it is a duty
of perfect or of imperfect obligation.’ (Beck: , p. ) Again, by accepting
a non-moral understanding of ‘duty’ we can avoid this consequence and provide
an interpretation that satisfies the structural requirements. is provides yet more
support for the offered reading of the categories of modality and of the proposed
interpretation of :. It is a fundamental characteristic of a table of categories that
the categories falling under each heading constitute a three-fold synthetic unity.
Categories are fundamental concepts and this can only be assured insofar as the
third arises out of the other two in a non-derivative way. Accordingly, we cannot
have the third category arising from a simple sub-division of the second, which
implies that we must accept a non-moral understanding of ‘duty’.
e third category arises from the other two since ‘necessity is nothing other
than the existence that is given by possibility itself.’ (B) Necessity is actual-
ity in all possible worlds. Or expressed negatively, necessity is the impossibility of
non-existence (cf. letter by J. Schultz //, :). Accordingly, the third
category is not to be seen as a sub-division of the second. Rather the third consti-
tutes an exhaustive division of apodictic rules, while apodictic rules can be seen as
a synthesis of problematic and assertoric rules. at is, synthesising problematic
and assertoric imperatives gives us apodictic imperatives. Apodictic necessitation
occurs if the possibility of the condition implies its actuality. Apodictically ne-
cessitating rules can then be exhaustively divided into necessary and contingent
duties.
C (): Apodictic practical rules are categorical imperatives. ey
are sensibly unconditioned and hold with necessity. Problematic and assertoric
rules are hypothetical imperatives that are conditional on desires, possible and
actual desires respectively. e practical necessitation of the first two categories is
necessitatio problematica and pragmatica, respectively, while only that of the third
classifies as a necessitatio moralis.

 Conclusion
us, we can see that the table of categories of freedom in regard of the concepts
of good and evil is the table of the pure fundamental practical concepts that gov-
ern the synthesis of the manifold of desires, thereby producing practical rules that
are assessable from a moral point of view. Any interpretation of the categories
must meet two general criteria deriving from the structure of the table, namely
that (i) the third category under each heading derives from the combination of
the prior two, and that (ii) the first two categories must be morally undetermined
and sensibly conditioned, while the third is morally determined and sensibly un-
conditioned. e interpretation offered in this paper meets both criteria, as well
as other structural conditions peculiar to particular headings.
Moreover, this interpretation makes the table intelligible by explaining the
categories in terms of well-known Kantian concepts and distinctions, such as that
between problematic, assertoric and apodictic imperatives. As Kant says in a foot-
note in the Preface, we have only to do with this distinction. ough the table of
categories is not quite intelligible in itself, as Kant claimed, it is relatively straight-
forward once the terminological fog has been cleared. e categories of modality
are easily understood once the connection to the different kinds of imperatives has
been made. Similarly, we can appeal to Kant’s characterisation of different princi-
ples in x of the Analytic in order to get a good understanding of the categories of
quantity. e categories falling under the heading of quality are straightforward
and only the categories of relation are problematic but can be modelled on the
categories of nature.
is interpretation of the categories of freedom implies that they are the fun-
damental characteristics of a practical rule that is assessable from a moral point of
view. e manifold of desires is synthesised and ordered to produce a practical
rule or maxim. is synthesis is subject to the rules embodied by the categories.
Each heading represents one feature of practical rules with respect to which de-
sires must be synthesised. e intrinsic characteristics of such a rule can be fully
specified in terms of the mathematical categories in the form of: I/we/all - Do
X/Don’t do X/(Do, though rule that not/don’t though rule that do). Its extrinsic
characteristics are specified by means of the dynamical categories which determine
that this rule inheres in a particular subject, has certain effects on the conditions
of particular persons and may be co-ordinatable in such a way as to allow its re-
ciprocal implementation. Moreover, the dynamical categories determine that this
rule necessitates either problematically, assertorically or apodictically.
I would like to thank Jens Timmermann and Allen Wood for helpful discussions and com-
ments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to the participants of the conference on
Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason at the University of St Andrews and to an audience at Stanford
University.
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